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     Abstract 
 
This article revises in the light of recent research a previously published and widely cited 
explanatory framework for considering public responses to wind farm developments (Bell et al. 
2005).  In the preceding work, two gaps were distinguished: a ‘social gap’ between the high 
support for wind energy reported in surveys and the low success rate for wind farm applications; 
and an ‘individual gap’ whereby an individual supports wind energy in general but opposes a local 
wind farm (NIMBYism). The popular assumption that NIMBYism was the only explanation for 
the ‘social gap’ was contested. Instead, three explanations of the social gap were provided – 
democratic deficit; qualified support; and NIMBYism – and a range of different policy responses 
were suggested.  In this article, this analysis is re-visited in order to take account of the theoretical 
and empirical developments which have taken place since its publication. The original explanatory 
framework is expanded and revised and new conclusions are drawn about the likely causes of the 
‘social gap’.  
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Re-visiting the ‘Social Gap’: Public Opinion and Relations of Power in the 
Local Politics of Wind Energy. 
 
Introduction  
In 2005, we asked the question ‘if approximately 80% of the public in the UK support wind 
energy, why is only a quarter of contracted wind power capacity actually commissioned?’ 
(Bell et al. 2005, p. 460; henceforth SG1). We suggested that ‘NIMBYism’ was not likely to 
be a sufficient explanation for this ‘social gap’, and we proposed two additional explanations 
and discussed their implications for policy.  
Our first explanation was a ‘democratic deficit’ (SG1, p. 461), whereby the decision-
making processes are dominated by the small number of unrepresentative wind farm 
opponents. Our second explanation for the social gap was that proponents are ‘qualified 
supporters’ of wind energy (SG1, p. 463). So, while surveys report high levels of support, that 
support might actually be qualified or conditional in some way. Our third explanation was 
‘self-interest’ or ‘NIMBYism’: people support wind farms but not in their backyard (SG1, p. 
465). The aim of this paper is to re-visit the account of the ‘social gap’ that we offered, 
review the evidence that has accumulated since SG1, and take forward our explanations for 
the gap between public support and siting success. 
The paper is divided into the following sections. First, we discuss the wider 
significance of the social gap. Second, we ‘re-measure’ the social gap. Third, we re-consider 
our explanations of the social gap and present a new framework for analysis. Fourth, we 
incorporate a revised typology of public attitudes into our framework. Finally, we reflect on 
relations of power in the local politics of wind energy, before our concluding remarks.  
 
1. The wider significance of the social gap   
In SG1, we presented the ‘social gap’ as a puzzle: why is there a low success rate in planning 
applications for wind  farms when there is such a high level of public support for wind 
energy? We continue to believe that understanding the causes of this social gap is important 
if the UK’s ambitious targets for wind energy capacity are to be achieved (DECC 2011). 
Moreover, it may have wider significance in two respects. 
 First, the social gap may not be confined to wind energy but may also apply to other 
forms of renewable energy, such as solar energy, hydroelectric energy and energy from 
biomass. Research suggests that there are high levels of public support in the UK for solar 
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(87%) and hydroelectric (76%) and majority support for biomass (54%) (UEA/Mori 2005 
cited in Pidgeon et al. 2008, p. 75). However, the installed capacity of all three types of 
energy remains relatively low (DECC 2012).
1
 More careful examination of the evidence 
could assess whether other forms of renewable energy experience a social gap.  If this is the 
case, any lessons from studying the social gap in wind energy politics may be applicable to 
other renewable energies.  
 Second, more ambitiously, the social gap may be a useful concept for thinking about 
the relationship between public opinion and political outcomes in democratic politics more 
generally. There may be many issues where majority public opinion – as reported in public 
opinion surveys – appears to favour an outcome that is not delivered by the political process. 
If so, the social gap may be a prima facie concern for advocates of majoritarian democracy. 
 
2. ‘Re-measuring’ the social gap. 
In SG1, we introduced the social gap in the context of wind energy by claiming, following 
Toke (2002), that approximately 80% of the public in the UK support wind energy in public 
opinion surveys but ‘only a quarter of contracted wind power capacity [is] actually 
commissioned’ (SG1, p. 460). Other authors have subsequently claimed that there is a ‘social 
gap’ in other countries, including the U.S. (Phadke 2011), New Zealand (Graham et al. 2009) 
and Australia (Hindmarsh and Matthews 2008). However, the evidence base for these claims 
has been questioned. For example, Aitken argues that since ‘within the literature references to 
opinion polls and other surveys are typically brief’, the ‘basis for the prevailing belief that the 
majority of the public supports wind power remains largely unsubstantiated’ (2010a, p. 
1835). Moreover, she has also challenged the claim that the success rate in planning 
applications for wind energy is low (Aitken et al. 2008). In this section, we briefly examine 
the available evidence for the UK. 
Whitmarsh et al. (2011, p.49) report that ‘nationally representative surveys have 
shown that, depending on the exact question asked, around 80% of the British population 
have favourable views of wind energy’. Whitmarsh et al. cite five surveys published between 
2006 and 2008. The results of those surveys are presented in table 1 with data from two other 
nationally representative surveys conducted in 2003 and 2011, including the most recent 
Eurobarometer survey (March 2011) to ask about wind energy. Although different surveys 
ask different questions and allow different answers (see table 1), nevertheless  the data from 
these seven surveys supports the claim that a large majority of the UK public (approximately 
80%) favour wind energy while approximately 50% ‘strongly’ favour wind energy. This 
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provides support for the first part of the ‘social gap’ claim, namely, that opinion surveys 
show a consistently high level of public support for wind energy.
2
  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The second part of the social gap claim (that only 25% of proposed wind energy 
projects come to fruition) might be understood in more than one way. The relevant data could 
be the success rate in wind energy planning decisions; but this may be misleading because 
some applications might be withdrawn before decision or approved developments might not 
be built. Therefore, we should be interested in the installed capacity relative to the number of 
planning applications. We provide data on both.  
Table 2 presents data on onshore wind energy planning submissions, approvals and 
rejections and the number of developments built in the UK over the period 2004-10. The data 
shows that over 50% of applications that were decided in the period were approved. The 
success rate is much higher than the 25% that we claimed in SG1, suggesting that the gap 
between  high public support for wind energy and the success rate in planning decisions is 
much less than we thought. There is some evidence to suggest that the success rate in 
planning decisions may be higher now than it was up to 2001 (Toke 2005a). However, using 
this data, it seems that the social gap may never have been as large as we originally suggested 
– and may be smaller now.  
In contrast, if we compare data on the number of onshore wind planning applications 
submitted and the number of developments built in the period 2004-10, the social gap appears 
larger. In total, planning applications for 854 developments with a total capacity of 16921.33 
MW were submitted but only 201 developments were built with a total capacity of 3350.55 
MW. So, the number of developments built was only 23.5% of the number of applications 
submitted. Of course, it may be that some of the applications submitted may have been (or 
will be) built after 2010. However, it may also be that some applications were withdrawn or 
that developments that were approved were not built. So, as we might have expected, the data 
on installed capacity relative to planning applications suggests a larger social gap than the 
data on success rates in planning decisions. It is not clear that either interpretation provides an 
unproblematic account of the ‘outcomes’ of wind energy politics. However, both 
interpretations support – to varying extents – the claim that prima facie there is a gap between 
the ‘inputs’ (80% public support for wind energy) and the ‘outcomes’ of wind energy 
politics. 
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TABLE 2 HERE 
 
3. Re-considering explanations of the social gap: a new framework for analysis 
In SG1, we distinguished three explanations of this social gap: democratic deficit; qualified 
support; and self-interest. The initial motivation for the paper was to contest the assumption 
that NIMBYism (or self-interest) was the only plausible explanation of the social gap. Our 
aim was to explore the theoretical space for alternative explanations and to consider the 
different implications for policy of those alternative explanations. Our simple threefold 
typology of explanations has been widely cited (Wustenhagen et al. 2007, Wolsink 2007, 
Walker and Devine-Wright 2008, Devine-Wright 2009, Van der Horst and Toke 2010, 
Cowell et al. 2011). In most cases, our three alternative explanations have been reported as 
part of a more general review of the literature on wind energy politics (Barry et al. 2008, 
Eltham et al. 2008, Warren and Birnie 2009, Phadke 2010, Swofford and Slattery 2010, 
Evans et al. 2011, Jepson et al. 2012, Waldo 2012). More interestingly, in a few cases, our 
typology has been used to inform analysis of original empirical data (Jones and Eiser 2009, 
Sturzaker 2011). In these cases, the tendency has been to argue that the data supports the 
‘qualified support’ explanation of the social gap (Jones and Eiser 2009, Sturzaker 2011). 
However, our typology of explanations has also been criticised. Agterbosch et al. 
(2009) argue that our threefold typology of explanations is problematic for two reasons. First, 
they ‘notice that these explanations are not mutually exclusive’ (2009, p. 205). Second, they 
claim that these three explanations ‘do not provide a proper picture of the complex and 
interactive nature of the formal public policy framework and social conditions at the 
operational level of implementation’ (2009, p. 405). In response to these criticisms, we have 
expanded and revised our explanatory framework.   
 In SG1, we were not clear about whether our three explanations of the social gap 
were mutually exclusive. On the one hand, we presented our three explanations as 
independent and competing accounts of the cause of the social gap. On the other hand, we 
‘emphasised the importance of empirical research to examine the relative contribution of 
[these] explanations to the social gap’ (SG1, p. 474). Our apparent inconsistency reflected a 
problem with our account. We failed to adequately distinguish two aspects of each 
explanation. Each explanation addressed two distinct questions. First, what is the makeup of 
public opinion? Second, what are the relations of power in local wind energy politics? 
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Disentangling these two questions helps us to address both of the concerns raised by 
Agterbosch et al. 
First, disentangling the two questions helps us to understand how our three 
explanations are related to each other. The ‘self-interest’ and ‘qualified support’ explanations 
make competing claims about the makeup of public opinion. On one account, the majority of 
people are NIMBYs. On the other account, the majority of people are qualified supporters. 
The democratic deficit explanation also makes a claim about the makeup of public opinion: a 
minority of people are unqualified opponents of wind energy. However, notice that this last 
claim is not inconsistent with the claims made about the makeup of public opinion in the 
other two explanations: the minority of people can be unqualified opponents and the majority 
of people can be qualified supporters (or NIMBYs). All three accounts also make claims 
about the relations of power in local wind energy politics. The democratic deficit explanation 
claims that power lies with the (minority) group of unqualified opponents. In contrast, the 
other two explanations both assume that power lies with the majority (who are either 
NIMBYs or qualified supporters). 
Second, distinguishing the two questions shows that our three explanations do not 
exhaust the logical space of alternative explanations for the social gap. Explanations can vary 
along two dimensions: the makeup of public opinion; and the relations of power in local wind 
energy politics. Our three explanations took very simple positions on each dimension. We 
might imagine many alternative explanations of the social gap that take more complex 
positions on each dimension. On the public opinion dimension, we might, for example, 
hypothesise that the makeup of public opinion could be such that there is no majority group 
but rather a plurality of qualified supporters and minority groups of NIMBYs, unqualified 
opponents and unqualified supporters. On the political power dimension, we might imagine 
that the relations of power between different stakeholders, including the public, developers, 
energy companies, non-governmental organisations, local authorities, planning inspectors, 
and central government departments, might not consistently or straightforwardly produce 
either majority rule or minority rule in the local politics of wind energy.  
In the next two sections, we consider what we can learn from the recent literature 
about the makeup of public opinion (Section 4) and the relations of power in the local politics 
of wind energy (Section 5).  
 
 
4. Revised typology of public attitudes 
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The public opinion surveys that we reported in Section 2 are based on an over-simplified 
typology of public attitudes: ranging from ‘strongly favour’ to ‘strongly oppose’. Similarly, 
popular media coverage of wind energy disputes is often based on a simplistic account of 
public attitudes: opponents of wind energy are NIMBYs (Jenkins 2012). In SG1, we offered 
an alternative typology of public attitudes, which included qualified supporters, NIMBYs and 
unqualified opponents – and suggested that they might be key actor ‘types’ in wind energy 
politics. In this section, we draw on the recent literature on public attitudes to wind energy to 
address two questions. First, does our typology of public attitudes require revision or 
refinement?  Second, what do we know about the relative proportions of different attitude 
‘types’ in the UK population? 
 The recent literature suggests three refinements to our typology. First, we should 
revise our typology to include a new attitude type: the ‘place-protector’. This category draws 
theoretical inspiration from work in environmental psychology and geography on ‘place 
attachment’ (Devine-Wright 2009, Devine-Wright 2011, Devine-Wright and Howes, 2009). 
Place attachment is defined as ‘positively experienced bonds, sometimes occurring without 
awareness, that are developed over time from the behavioral, affective and cognitive ties 
between individuals and/or groups and their sociophysical environment’ (Brown and Perkins 
1992, p. 284 cited in Devine-Wright 2012, p. 3). On this account, landscape concerns are not 
simply based on an aesthetic or visual appreciation of the landscape, but reflect the 
experience of living or spending time in a particular place. The place-protector is not a 
qualified supporter because she does not impose a universalisable qualification on her support 
for wind energy, such as wind farms should not be located in areas with particular landscape 
features.  Neither is the place-protector a NIMBY because she does not oppose local 
development for self-interested reasons. Instead, the place-protector opposes a local 
development because of the value that she sees in that particular place while not seeing the 
same value or remaining agnostic on the value of other places where developments might 
take place.  
Recognising this new attitude type is practically important because the place-protector 
may respond differently from NIMBYs and qualified supporters to development policies and 
practices. For example, the place-protector may be less impressed than the NIMBY by 
financial incentives offered by developers. Similarly, the place-protector might understand 
the impact of ‘industrial’ or ‘technological’ developments in a place quite differently from 
someone whose concerns are purely about visual impact on a landscape (Pasqualetti, 2001, 
McLachlan 2009, 2010)
3
. 
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 Second, we should refine our typology by distinguishing some of the different types 
of conditions that qualified supporters require acceptable developments to meet (for example 
in relation to noise – Haggett 2010, size – Warren and Birnie 2009, number – Barry and 
Chapman 2009, safety of bird populations – Solli, 2010,  environmental protection – Graham 
et al. 2009, community involvement in the design and decision making processes – Fisher 
and Brown 2009Breukers and Wolsink, 2007a, and fair distribution of economic benefits – 
Aitken 2010b). Devine-Wright’s review of the literature identified 17 types of qualifications 
and categorised them into eight broad categories, including ‘physical’, ‘contextual’ and 
‘local’ (Devine-Wright 2005, p. 135). This typology builds on previous work (e.g., Wolsink 
2000) but provides a more systematic and comprehensive framework for classifying the 
reasons that people oppose developments.  It has been used by other researchers with some 
proposing refinements where their data has suggested gaps (Graham et al. 2009). We believe 
that this is a useful strategy for developing a practical understanding of qualified support, 
which could be used by researchers (as well as policy-makers and developers) to analyse the 
detailed makeup of public opinion and the relative frequency of particular types of concern 
about wind energy. 
 Third, we should also refine our typology by recognising the importance of 
considering the relationships between the different types of conditions that qualified 
supporters impose on their support for wind energy. For example, Haggett and Futak-
Campbell (2011) use discourse analysis to identify various discursive positions, such as 
‘champions for the planet’, and ‘clean energy sceptics’, which include a range of inter-
connected qualifications and views (see also Jessup, 2010; and Solli, 2010).  Similarly, Ellis 
et al. (2007) use q-methodology to distinguish four distinct objector discourses and four 
supporter discourses, and argue that ‘each objector discourse is constructed from a 
combination of different elements’ (2007, p531). We believe that our understanding might be 
significantly enhanced by applying q-methodology or discourse analysis to a much larger 
dataset based on interviews with a statistically representative sample of the population. If we 
could categorise qualified supporters based on the clusters of conditions that they believe 
developments should meet, we could determine which types of qualified supporters are likely 
to be relatively easy to satisfy with well-designed developments proposals and which are 
likely to be very rarely satisfied by a development proposal.   
 Based on our reading of the recent literature on attitudes to wind energy, we have 
suggested three revisions or refinements to our typology of attitudes. The second question 
that we want to address is: What do we already know about the relative proportions of 
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different attitude ‘types’ in the UK population? A critical reading of the recent literature 
suggests three provisional conclusions. 
 First, much of the social science literature on wind energy argues that the NIMBY 
label oversimplifies and mischaracterises local opposition to wind energy developments 
(Warren and Birnie 2009, Aitken 2010a, Jessup 2010, Haggett 2011), and we agree that this 
is indeed the case when the label is used as a simple descriptor for all and any protest (e.g., 
Feldman and Turner 2010). It has been argued that we should study how advocates of wind 
energy use ‘NIMBY’ discursively to de-legitimise opponents of wind energy but we should 
not study whether opponents are NIMBYs (Burningham 2000, Wolsink 2006).  We agree that 
it is important to study the discursive use of ‘NIMBY’ in wind energy politics (Haggett and 
Toke 2006) but we still believe it matters whether some people oppose local wind energy 
developments for self-interested reasons but are willing to support developments elsewhere 
that might affect other people in the same way. The self-interested NIMBY is probably 
relatively rare but the evidence is less conclusive than much of the literature suggests because 
most studies have not been designed to distinguish NIMBYs from place-protectors or 
qualified supporters.  Moreover, small-n qualitative studies based on interviews with 
protagonists in wind energy disputes (e.g., Waldo 2012) cannot conclusively show that 
NIMBYs do not exist because they may simply be missing from the small sample. 
Furthermore, studies which examine people’s concerns about wind farms often argue 
that their data shows opposition is based on landscape effects (Jessup 2010) or concerns 
about procedural or distributive fairness (Gross 2007) rather than self-interested reasons. 
However, while this suggests that the number of NIMBYs is small, it does not show that 
there are no NIMBYs. In contrast, some studies do identify what appear to be concerns 
connected to economic self-interest, such as the negative effects of wind farms on house 
prices (Barry et al. 2008, Jones and Eiser 2009, Upham 2009). However, these studies do not 
show that the respondents are NIMBYs. If, for example, a respondent believes that wind 
energy developments should go ahead only if they do not have a significant negative effect 
on the price of either the respondent’s house or anyone else’s house, they are a qualified 
supporter of wind energy not a NIMBY. The NIMBY is a self-interested free-rider who is not 
concerned about the negative effects of wind energy developments on other people.  
To summarise, there is no conclusive evidence in the literature that there are people 
who hold the combination of attitudes that are associated with NIMBYism. However, this 
may be due to the absence of research that could demonstrate the existence of NIMBYs. We 
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only know that if there are any NIMBYs they are likely to be a small proportion of the 
population nationally.  
  The second provisional conclusion that we draw from the recent literature is that 
concerns about the landscape effects of developments are most common among and often 
most important for opponents of wind farms (Smith and Klick 2007, Jones and Eiser 2010, 
Jessup 2010, Breukers and Wolsink, 2007a ). However, we do not know whether those who 
express landscape concerns are qualified supporters or place-protectors. Some discussions 
assume that those who express landscape concerns are qualified supporters (e.g., Hindmarsh 
and Matthews 2008) while others regard them as place-protectors (Devine-Wright 2009, 
McLachlan 2009, 2010). We could only separate the two attitude types by looking in more 
detail at how they express their concerns about landscape/place and by examining their 
attitudes to local and non-local proposed developments. For example, if someone identifies 
generic features of landscapes that make them unsuitable for wind farms in both local and 
non-local places, it would seem appropriate to classify them as a qualified supporter. In 
contrast, if someone appeals to the specialness of their local place and makes different 
judgements about proposed local and non-local developments, which (might generally be 
agreed to) have similar features, it may be appropriate to classify them as a place-protector.  
 Our third provisional conclusion is that concerns about fairness are also very common 
and often very important for qualified supporters of wind energy (Gross 2007, Haggett 2008). 
Opponents of wind energy developments often highlight both the unfairness of the process of 
decision-making about developments and the unfairness of the distribution of benefits and 
burdens associated with developments (Gross 2007, Fisher and Brown 2009). Concerns about 
procedural fairness may be especially significant where a major energy company proposes a 
development and local people feel that they have not been consulted at an early stage about 
the proposed development or have not had an opportunity to influence the siting process 
(Agterbosch et al. 2009). However, recent research has also shown that concerns about 
procedural fairness can arise in community-led developments when some members of the 
community feel that they have been excluded from the decision-making process (Walker et 
al. 2010).  
Concerns about distributive fairness may be raised in relation to both burdens and 
benefits. First, the concentration of developments in particular geographical areas may raise 
concerns about whether the landscape and other costs associated with hosting wind energy 
developments are being distributed fairly between different communities (Brack and Haggett 
forthcoming). Second, the distribution of the benefits of wind energy developments may be 
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considered unfair if local communities (or some members of local communities) receive little 
or no benefits while developers and energy companies make large profits, landowners are 
paid annual rents for the use of their land for siting wind turbines, and consumers elsewhere 
in the country use more energy than the communities hosting developments (Jobert et al. 
2007).  
Developers have increasingly acted to address the concerns of this type of qualified 
supporter by seeking to engage local communities earlier in the siting process and by offering 
‘community benefits’ packages to local communities (Aitken 2010b, Cowell et al. 2011). 
However, the existing research provides only a limited picture of the principles (and 
practices) of procedural and distributive fairness that qualified supporters are most likely to 
require developments to satisfy. So, there is more to learn about the relative frequency and 
importance of different types of fairness-related conditions that qualified supporters place on 
their support for wind energy developments.  
 In this section, we have proposed revisions to our typology of attitudes to wind energy 
and presented some provisional conclusions about the makeup of public opinion. We believe 
that the evidence suggests that there are large numbers of qualified supporters of wind energy 
(who are concerned especially about landscape and fairness), some place-protectors (but we 
do not know how many of those concerned about landscape/place are place-protectors and 
how many are qualified supporters), a small number of unqualified opponents (who indicate 
that they are ‘strongly opposed’ to wind energy in surveys), and there may be a small number 
of NIMBYs (but the evidence remains inconclusive). 
 
5. Relations of power in the local politics of wind energy 
In SG1, we offered an over-simplified account of the relations of power in the local politics 
of wind energy by considering only two alternatives: majority rule and minority rule. In this 
section, we propose a more sophisticated approach to the democratic deficit explanation, 
which uses a new institutionalist theoretical framework to analyse relations of power among 
members of the public with different attitude types and among other stakeholders, including 
developers, local authorities, environmental groups, local planning officers, planning 
inspectors and central government departments (Breuuekers and Wolsink 2007b). We outline 
four general conclusions that we believe are suggested by the recent literature. 
 First, local members of the public can and do block or delay wind energy 
developments. The power of local communities is widely acknowledged in the literature (e.g., 
Breuuekers and Wolsink 2007b, Eltham et al. 2008, Graham et al. 2009, Jones and Eiser 
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2009, 2010, Phadke 2011). For example, Righter (2002, p. 37) claims that ‘small numbers of 
dedicated opponents can and will attack projects, crushing developers with their passion’. 
Less dramatically, Swofford and Slattery (2010, p. 2517) assert that ‘the attitudes of those 
living in close proximity to a wind farm project have a strong effect on planning 
[applications]’. As Righter (2002) suggests, local opponents may not even need to be large in 
number. If they are well motivated, well-resourced and strategically astute, they may be able 
to influence local planning officers or local councillors so that a development is delayed or 
even blocked. In saying this, we are endorsing a revised version of the democratic deficit 
explanation that we offered in SG1. Our original version hypothesised that a minority group 
of unconditional opponents of wind energy might have the power to block developments. Our 
revised claim is that a minority group of local members of the public – which might be made 
up of unqualified opponents or qualified supporters (who do not believe this development 
meets the right conditions) or place-protectors or even NIMBYs or, most likely, will include 
people with different attitudes to wind energy – will often have the power to block 
developments. 
However, the assumption that local opponents are able to block developments has 
been challenged in the UK (Aitken et al. 2008) and in several other countries, including 
Australia (Hindmarsh and Matthews 2008), Spain (Zografos and Martinez-Alier 2009) and 
Sweden (Waldo 2012). In the UK context, Aitken has argued that local campaigns may delay 
wind farm projects by persuading local councils to refuse planning permission but they do not 
block them because developers invariably challenge the local decision and planning 
permission is usually granted after a public inquiry (Aitken et al. 2008, Aitken 2009, 2010c). 
Warren and Birnie (2009, p.108) suggest that Aitken’s argument is ‘supported by the fact that 
over 90% of planning applications for onshore wind farms [in Scotland] are approved’.4 
It may be that Aitken’s assessment of the limited power of local opponents is correct 
in Scotland (where the data suggests that there is not a significant gap between public opinion 
and success for wind energy developments in the planning process). However, as we saw 
earlier, the success rate of developers in planning decisions has been lower in the UK as a 
whole (Table 2). Moreover, data collected by van der Horst and Toke (2010, p. 215) on wind 
energy planning applications in England between 1991 and 2006 suggests that out of the 37 
applications rejected by local authorities only 8 had been approved on appeal.
5
 So, opponents 
do not appear to be powerless at the appeal stage. Moreover, there is significant evidence 
from case studies that successful campaigns against proposed developments are usually led 
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by people living in close proximity to them (Swofford and Slattery 2010, Kaldellis et al. 
2012). 
 Our second conclusion is that some local communities may be more likely to be 
successful in blocking developments than others. There is some evidence that wind energy 
developments are more likely to be rejected on appeal when they are proposed in 
communities where there is higher life expectancy, higher voter turnout in national elections, 
lower health deprivation, more people working in the private sector, and more second and 
holiday homes (van der Horst and Toke 2010). The suggestion here is that local opposition is 
more likely to be successful when it is better resourced – economically, legally, technically 
and in terms of social and political capital. More empirical studies would be required to 
confirm this conclusion but it seems consistent with new institutionalist analyses of the 
important role of a wide range of different types of resources in relations of power.  
 The third conclusion that we draw from the recent literature is that local opponents are 
not the only significant opponents of wind energy developments. Indeed, it may be that other 
stakeholders, in particular, nature or landscape conservation groups, may exercise as much or 
more power in the local politics of wind energy (Toke 2005a). For example, Toke (2005a, p. 
1532) has argued that ‘when the Campaign for Protection of Rural England objects to a 
proposal then that planning application is almost certain to be refused at a Council level’.  
Conservation groups have the necessary financial, legal and knowledge resources, and have 
well-rehearsed strategies for opposing wind energy developments (Haggett and Futak-
Campbell 2011). Co-operation among different kinds of opponents of a particular wind 
energy development, which enables the pooling of resources and the use of mixed strategies 
that seek to influence decision-making through various channels, may be more likely to 
succeed. More detailed empirical studies of a larger number of cases would be necessary to 
confirm this conclusion but it is consistent with new institutionalist analyses of the 
importance of network resources in relations of power and with other analyses of the role of 
national non-governmental organisations in local environmental campaigns (Rootes 2013).  
 Our fourth conclusion is that the relations of power in the local politics of wind 
energy are significantly altered when there is active local support for a ‘community’ wind 
energy scheme (Toke, 2011, Barry and Chapman 2009, Rogers et al. 2008). A common 
argument is that the amount of installed wind energy capacity in the UK would be increased 
by encouraging small scale, community-led developments (Warren and Birnie 2009, Warren 
and McFayden 2010). This argument is often supported by appealing to the experience of 
other countries, such as Denmark (Toke 2011; 2005b, Toke et al. 2008). However, more 
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recent research in the UK has problematised the notion of ‘community’ wind energy (Walker 
and Devine-Wright 2008). Community wind schemes will not always enjoy unanimous – or 
even majority – support in the local community (Hoffman and High-Pippert, 2005, Walker et 
al. 2010). Instead, community schemes may be developed by small groups of local activists, 
sometimes in collaboration with local authorities or larger wind energy developers (Walker et 
al. 2007). As a result, ‘community’-led schemes may be as controversial in the local 
community as developments proposed by multinational energy companies (Walker et al. 
2010). More research would be required to properly understand how different features of 
different kinds of ‘community’-led schemes affect the relations of power in the local politics 
of wind energy but we can be confident that the involvement of local pro-wind activists will 
often have an impact – even if it remains an open question whether ‘community’-led schemes 
are an effective way of increasing installed wind energy capacity in the UK. 
  In this section, we have presented four conclusions about the relations of power in the 
local politics of wind energy in the UK, which have refined our democratic deficit 
explanation. We believe that the institutional rules governing wind energy planning 
applications allow some well-resourced local opponents with strong commitments (supported 
by well-networked and well-resourced national interest groups) to effectively oppose 
developments. So, the opponents of any particular wind energy development may be a 
minority nationally and even locally but they might still be able to successfully block the 
development. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The aim in SG1 was to contest the suggestion that NIMBYism or self-interest was the only 
explanation for the gap between the high level of public support for wind energy in opinion 
surveys and the relatively low level of installed wind energy capacity in the UK. We 
proposed two alternative explanations: the majority of the public are qualified supporters and 
they determine the outcome of wind energy planning applications; or a minority of the public 
are unqualified opponents and they determine the outcome of wind energy planning 
applications. In this article, we have re-asserted our belief that the social gap is politically 
significant and we have provided more data to support its existence and clarify its size. More 
importantly, we have acknowledged that our original explanatory framework was too simple 
to capture the range of possible explanations of the social gap.  
We have re-interpreted the three explanations that we previously offered in a new 
theoretical framework, which distinguishes two questions: What is the makeup of public 
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opinion on wind energy? What are the relations of power in the local politics of wind energy? 
We believe that any explanation of the social gap should provide answers to both questions. 
The answer it offers to the first question should provide a critical perspective on the results of 
standard public opinion surveys that show 80% of the public in the UK support wind energy. 
The answer it offers to the second question should provide a better understanding of who 
blocks wind energy developments and under what conditions they are able to do so. Together, 
these two answers should explain the social gap. 
 In this article, although we still do not claim to have offered a definitive explanation 
of the social gap, we believe that it is most likely to be a consequence of two factors. First, 
the evidence suggests that there are large numbers of qualified supporters and (some) place 
protectors as well as a few unqualified opponents and, perhaps, some self-interested 
NIMBYs, who may all work together to oppose particular wind energy developments. So, it 
seems likely to be a mistake to try to explain the social gap by reference to the actions (or 
power) of people with any single attitude type (as we did in SG1 with each of our three 
explanations). Second, the institutional rules governing wind energy planning applications 
allow some well-resourced local opponents with strong commitments, supported by well-
networked and well-resourced national interest groups, to effectively oppose developments. 
So, the opponents of any particular wind energy development may be a minority nationally 
and even locally but they might still be able to successfully block that development.  
 Finally, we want to note two issues for future research and offer a brief thought on the 
broader implications of our analysis. There are two areas for further research that might 
‘deepen’ our understanding of the causes of the social gap, while also providing policy-
makers with more useful guidance on how the gap might be closed and the level of installed 
wind energy increased. First, if many people are qualified supporters and most qualified 
supporters are concerned about landscape and fairness, the key to understanding, and 
potentially reducing, the social gap may lie in developing a better account of the detailed 
character of these concerns and the relations between them. For example, how do people 
value landscapes or places and in what ways do wind energy developments pose a threat to 
the value of landscapes or places? Similarly, what conceptions of procedural and distributive 
fairness tend to inform people’s concerns about wind energy developments and what is 
required to avoid (perceived) unfairness? And, how are different landscape/place-based 
concerns related to different fairness concerns? If we can answer these questions, we might 
better understand (in psychological terms) the causes of the social gap. Moreover, it might be 
clearer how policy-makers and developers could choose potential development sites and 
15 
 
design development processes that would be less likely to be opposed by a significant number 
of qualified supporters. Second, we might seek to better understand the conditions that make 
effective co-operation among opponents possible. For example, is effective opposition 
dependent on local opponents having the resources that come with living in a relatively 
affluent community? In what circumstances can developers prevent effective opposition by 
offering a community benefits package? If we can answer questions of this type, we might 
better understand (in new institutionalist terms) the causes of the social gap. Moreover, it 
might be clearer what policy-makers and developers could do to reduce the social gap by 
accommodating or avoiding opposition. 
 With regard to the wider implications of the paper, there may well be a social gap in 
other renewable energy sectors, and if there is, our findings imply that policy makers should 
be advised to bear in mind the complexity of the basis of the positions adopted by both 
supporters and opponents of proposed developments. As for broader implications for 
majoritarian democracy, the paper suggests that the existence of a social gap might not 
simply be the result of a democratic deficit, but may also represent a nuanced outcome of the 
multi-layered texture of public opinions. 
 
Notes 
1.   At the end of 2011, the installed capacity for large scale hydro, plant biomass and solar energy in    
      the UK was 1471MW, 1159MW and 976MW, respectively (DECC 2012, p.47).  
2.   Aitken (2010a) also raises questions about survey methods, epistemology and funder bias (see  
      also Ellis et al. 2007 for a discussion of the limitations of survey based research). These are  
      important questions that may lead us to question the significance of survey results – and,  
      derivatively, the significance of the social gap – but they do not challenge the claim that opinion  
      surveys show high levels of public support for wind energy.  
3
 Phadke (2010) makes a valuable point about the importance of visualisation technologies and 
techniques as opportunities for articulating and deliberating landscape value and place identity, which 
would be useful in distinguishing between qualified supporters, NIMBYs and place-protectors.. 
 
4.   Warren and Birnie are quoting data from Toke 2005c. 
5.   They report that 2 further appeals were still outstanding at the time of data collection. 
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Table 1. National opinion surveys on wind energy (2003-2011) 
Date Survey No. of 
people 
surveyed 
Question Answer format Results 
2003 TNS  
for DTI 
1279 What is your opinion of 
using onshore wind to 
generate electricity? 
 
 
 
What is your opinion of 
using offshore wind to 
generate electricity? 
Five options: ‘a 
very good idea’, ‘a 
fairly good idea’, 
‘neither a good idea 
nor a bad idea’, ‘a 
fairly bad idea’ or 
‘a very bad idea’. 
Onshore:  
49% a very 
good idea 
86% good idea 
(fairly or very) 
 
Offshore: 
51% a very 
good idea 
84% good idea 
(fairly or very) 
2006 Poortinga  
et al.  
1491 How favourable or 
unfavourable are your 
overall opinions or 
impressions of 
the following energy 
sources for producing 
electricity currently..?  
Wind Energy. 
Five options: ‘Very 
favourable’, 
‘Mainly 
favourable’, 
‘Neither favourable 
nor unfavourable’, 
‘Mainly 
unfavourable’ or 
‘Very 
unfavourable’.  
50% very 
favourable 
81% favourable 
(mainly or 
very) 
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2006 DTI 2032 I am now going to read 
out a list of statements 
about renewable energy, 
and I would like you to 
tell me how much you 
agree or disagree with 
each one. 
I am in favour of the use 
of wind power. 
Five options: 
‘Disagree strongly’, 
Disagree slightly’, 
‘Neither agree nor 
disagree’, ‘Agree 
slightly’, or ‘Agree 
strongly’. 
54% agree 
strongly 
81% agree 
(slightly or 
strongly) 
2006 Eurobarometer 
65.3 
1337 Are you in favour or 
opposed to the use of 
these different sources of 
energy in the UK?  Wind 
Energy 
Seven-point scale 
from ‘strongly 
opposed’ (1) to 
‘strongly in favour’ 
(7) 
44% strongly 
in favour (7) 
78% in favour 
(5, 6 or 7) 
 
Average score 
5.7 
2007 BERR 1970 I am now going to read 
out a list of statements 
about renewable energy, 
and I would like you to 
tell me how much you 
agree or disagree with 
each one. 
I am in favour of the use 
of wind power. 
Five options: 
‘Disagree strongly’, 
Disagree slightly’, 
‘Neither agree nor 
disagree’, ‘Agree 
slightly’, or ‘Agree 
strongly’. 
54% agree 
strongly 
82% agree 
(slightly or 
strongly) 
2008 BERR 2047 I am now going to read 
out a list of statements 
about renewable energy, 
and I would like you to 
tell me how much you 
agree or disagree with 
each one. 
I am in favour of the use 
of wind power. 
Five options: 
‘Disagree strongly’, 
Disagree slightly’, 
‘Neither agree nor 
disagree’, ‘Agree 
slightly’, or ‘Agree 
strongly’. 
50% agree 
strongly 
80% agree 
(slightly or 
strongly) 
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2011 Eurobarometer 
75.1 
1322 To what extent are you in 
favour of or opposed to 
the use of the following 
sources of energy in the 
UK?  Wind Energy 
Four options: 
‘Strongly in 
favour’, ‘Fairly in 
favour’, ‘Fairly 
opposed’ and 
‘strongly opposed’ 
61% strongly 
in favour 
91% in favour 
(fairly or 
strongly)  
Source: DTI 2003, Poortinga et al 2006, DTI 2006, Eurobarometer 65.3 2006, BERR 2007, BERR 2008, 
Eurobarometer 75.1 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Onshore wind farm developments in the UK (2004-2010) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Submitted 79 
(2874.81 
MW) 
95 
(2485.13 
MW) 
123 
(2162.65 
MW) 
122 
(1901.68 
MW) 
149 
(2080.95 
MW) 
138 
(3040.81 
MW) 
148 
(2114.33 
MW) 
Approved 31  
(635.13 
MW) 
40  
(671.56 
MW) 
38  
(876.55 
MW) 
63 
(1141.47 
MW) 
72 
(1766.43 
MW) 
98 
(1322.57 
MW) 
83  
(1351.14 
MW) 
Rejected  28  
(279.65 
MW) 
29  
(674.45 
MW) 
31 
(668.90 
MW) 
48  
(868.58 
MW) 
52 
(1578.10 
MW) 
67  
(759.95 
MW) 
84  
(1245.03 
MW) 
Built  11 
(181.14 
MW) 
22  
(369.73 
MW) 
21  
(531.50 
MW) 
28  
(359.25 
MW) 
41 
 (557.45 
MW) 
39 
(812.13 
MW) 
39 
 (539.35 
MW) 
Source: BWEA 2012 
 
